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NAFTA's Developmental Impact on
Mexico: Assessment and prospects
Impact socio-économique de l’ALENA au Mexique : Bilan et perspectives
Impacto socioeconómico del TLCAN sobre México: balance y perspectivas
Jean-Baptiste Velut
1 In  the  1990s,  the  proliferation  or  consolidation  of  regional  trade  agreements  in  the
Americas, Europe and Asia renewed century-old debates on the welfare effects of trade
liberalization.1 In Canada, Mexico and the United States, the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), designed to liberalize trade and investment flows across the North
American continent, crystallized tensions on the costs and benefits of free trade. These
stormy  controversies  took  decision-makers  by  surprise  to  the  extent  that  NAFTA
institutionalized  a  decade-long  process  of  economic  regionalization  between  North
American economies. In effect, NAFTA was the sum of two bilateral relationships that
converged in the United States. First, through a series of bilateral agreements – reciprocal
trade agreement (1935), Defense Production Sharing Agreement (1956) and the Auto Pact
(1965) – culminating with the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement of 1988, the
American and Canadian economies had grown increasingly interdependent through the
course of the twentieth century. Second, the gradual consolidation of the US-Mexican
economic  partnership  through  a  series  of  initiatives  like  the  Bracero  Program
(1943-1964),2 the creation of maquiladoras in 1965 and Washington’s financial rescue plans
during the Mexican debt crisis of the 1980s laid the ground for the signature of NAFTA. In
this sense, NAFTA was only a logical step in the long process of economic rapprochement in
North America. However, to a greater extent, NAFTA epitomized a power struggle for the
future of globalization, pitting free trade advocates against an unprecedented coalition of
labor,  environmental,  consumer  and  religious  organizations  that  denounced  the
corporate bias of the agreement and its neglect for social and environmental issues. In
the United States,  the NAFTA debates  heralded the beginning of  a  series  of  political
battles on the rules of American trade policy (Velut, 2009).
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2 If  the  core  logic  of  NAFTA  was  to  liberalize  trade  flows  between  North  American
economies,  the  agreement  was  as  much  about  liberalizing  and  protecting  foreign
investment as it was about dismantling trade barriers (Orme, 1996:126; Nishijima Smith,
1996:36). In this sense, NAFTA’s investment provisions constituted the final phase in the
restructuring of production processes on the North American continent. NAFTA also had
long ramifications that would encroach upon national sovereignty in a number of spheres
such  as  procurement  policies  or  intellectual  property  rights.  It  was  designed  as  a
“contractual agreement” that would protect investors and companies through a strong
dispute settlement mechanism (Deblock, Rioux 2010: 9-16).
3 In contrast, NAFTA’s institutional framework largely left out important social issues that
are  nonetheless  central  to  North  American  relations  such  as  internal  disparities  or
immigration. In addition, despite the efforts of unions and their allies, the agreement
gave little scope to labor and environmental  questions,  which were confined to low-
enforcement  “side  agreements,”  the  purpose  of  which  was  to  improve  cooperation
between the three member countries.3 Thus, while NAFTA can be considered as a classic
case of regionalism (Mansfield, Milner op.cit.), it also constitutes a sui generis regional
integration “model” developed primarily to maximize business efficiency through the
reorganization of production processes on a continental scale (Coste, 2004:187-207; Eden,
1994). NAFTA members were reluctant to establish strong supranational institutions, in
contrast with the deeper integration approach favored by European countries.4 The latter
have  adopted  an  ambitious  agenda  aimed at  solving  a  set  of  common transnational
problems in a variety of policy spheres. To do so, the European integration model rests
upon a strong institutional apparatus that NAFTA undoubtedly lacks. 
4 The narrow productivist logic of the NAFTA model along with the fierce controversies
that surrounded its signature and ratification have made it a perfect case study to assess
the linkage between trade liberalization and economic welfare. Since NAFTA came into
force in 1994, numerous scholars have attempted to assess its socio-economic impact on
North  American  economies.  In  congruence  with  the  debates  that  preceded  NAFTA’s
implementation, most studies of its impact have focused on sectoral dynamics (Robert,
2000;  Burfisher  Robinson  Thierfielder,  2001:  125-144),  employment  (especially  in  the
United States) (Ojeda, 2000; Haar, 2004: 55-67) and environmental questions (Gallagher,
2002: 119-141; Mann, Von Moltke, 1999). 
5 Some analysts have examined NAFTA’s socio-economic impact in Mexico in the prospect
of determining whether the agreement can be interpreted as a successful  or a failed
development  strategy.  Easterly  and  his  colleagues  tend  to  side  with  the  former
conclusion, arguing that the income gap declined after 1995, even though convergence
was partly hampered by Mexico’s lack of institutional reforms (Easterly, Fiess, Lederman,
2003:  1-53).  By contrast,  Blecker  and Esquivel,  along with Wise,  highlighted NAFTA’s
failure to meet  the promises of  its  advocates by demonstrating that  the income gap
between US and Mexican workers had remained stable since NAFTA’s passage(Blecker,
Esquivel, 2010: 17-30; Wise, op.cit.). Findings on the evolution of social inequality in the
post-NAFTA  period  are  similarly  contested.  In  2003,  Bizberg  analyzed  the  political
foundations  of  Mexico’s  export-oriented  strategy  and  its  repercussions  on  the  labor
market and pointed to a decline in real  wages and an increase in income inequality
(Bizberg,  2004:  69-85).  However,  two  later  studies  by  Campos-Vásquez  and  Esquivel
concluded that income inequality had declined in the post-NAFTA period.  Each study
highlighted different factors that are not directly related to trade liberalization: a rise in
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college enrollment rates and a lack of demand for top-skilled jobs in the case of Campos-
Vásquez; the implementation of new social programs, a growing flow of remittances as
well as increasing education levels for Esquivel (Campos-Vasquez, 2010; Esquivel, 2010). 
6 To  bolster  NAFTA’s  contested  developmental  record,  scholars  have  offered  either
domestic or supranational solutions. Some have put the emphasis on domestic reforms in
Mexico as a prerequisite for greater social cohesion within NAFTA (Wise, op.cit., Easterly,
Fiess,  Lederman, op.cit.),  or a precondition for the adoption of supranational reforms
(Hufbauer, Schott, op.cit.). Others have stressed the institutional weakness of NAFTA and
admonish decision-makers to look to the European Union for supranational solutions to
improve social cohesion across the North American continent (Studer, Pastor, op.cit.). 
7 This  article  builds  upon this  literature with two objectives:  clarifying the contrasted
findings on NAFTA’s socio-impact in Mexico during its first fifteen years of existence;
second, providing a set of policy prescriptions to improve NAFTA’s developmental record.
In contrast with the early arguments of both free trade advocates and anti-NAFTA critics,
NAFTA’s impact on Mexico has been neither a calamity nor a blessing. This means that
the agreement should not be jettisoned; nor should it be relegated the bottom list of
policymakers. Instead, the NAFTA model needs to be upgraded through both domestic
and international reforms in order to respond to the old and new challenges that Mexico
has had to face. 
 
Trade and investment under NAFTA
8 Regardless of whether one embraces or condemns the effects of economic liberalization,
it is hard to contest the fact that NAFTA has largely contributed to increase trade and
investment flows between North American economies. In fifteen years, trade among the
NAFTA partners more than tripled, from $289 billion in 1993 to $945 billion in 2008 (see
figure 1) (Secretaria de Economia,  2010).  This trend excludes the effect of the recent
recession, which took a significant toll on trade flows at both global and regional levels.
The Mexican economy directly benefited from this intensification of trade flows with its
North American partners. 
 
Figure 1
Source: Secretaría de Economía
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9 Mexico converted its bilateral merchandise trade balance with the United States from a
$2-billion deficit in 1993 to a $74-billion peak surplus in 2007 that would fall back to $48
billion in 2009. Mexican exports to the US grew fivefold between 1993 and 2008 (from $40
billion to $216 billion), while its imports from America almost quadrupled ($42 billion to
$151 billion) (see figure 2). 
 
Figure 2
Source: US Census Bureau
10 Through increased bilateral trade, the Mexican and American economies have become
increasingly interdependent. In 2009, Mexico was the third largest trading partner of the
United States, representing nearly 12% of US trade in 2009 (against 16% for Canada and
14% for China) (US Census Bureau, 2010). It absorbed almost one eighth of all U.S. exports
and was the first or second export destination for twenty-two U.S. states (Wilson Center,
2009). Mexico is considerably dependent on the US economy, which accounted for 51% of
Mexican imports and as much as 84% of its exports in 2009. This makes Mexico largely
vulnerable to economic recessions in the United States, as the recent crisis has shown.
Based on foreign trade statistics from the Secretaría de Economía and the Banco de México,
two thirds  of  the decline in Mexico’s  foreign trade in 2009 can be attributed to the
downturn in US-Mexican bilateral trade (Secretaria de Economia, op.cit.).
11 Beyond  the  close  economic  ties  between  Mexico  and  the  United  States,  Mexico’s
commercial relationship with Canada has also flourished under NAFTA. Despite its minor
significance for North American trilateral trade (about 3% in 2009), Mexican-Canadian
bilateral trade has surged six-fold over the past fifteen years (from $4 billion in 1993 to
$26 billion in 2008). This has, once again, largely benefited Mexico, whose trade surplus
jumped from $2 billion in 1993 to $7 billion in 2008 (Secretaria de Economia, op.cit.).
12 At the top of Mexico’s export list are manufacturing goods ranging from auto parts to
electronic  goods  like  TV  sets  and  telephones,  oil  and  petrochemicals  (INEGI,  2010).
Mexican agricultural exports also increased under NAFTA, and particularly vegetables
and fruit exports, which doubled from 1994 to 2005 (Zahniser, 2007: 23). The increase in
non-oil  exports was perhaps one of the most successful elements of Mexico’s export-
oriented strategy under NAFTA. According to Juan Carlos Moreno Brid, economist at the
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL), Mexico experienced
between  1994  and  2002  the  second  fastest  rise  in  the  share  of  world  exports  of
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manufacturing  goods  after  China.5 Mexican  maquiladoras played  a  major  role  in  the
growth of the manufacturing sector, which was concentrated in no more than 300 firms
often linked with multinational corporations.6 
13 Admittedly, the performance of Mexico’s exporting sector largely owes to the devaluation
of  its  currency  during  the  peso  crisis  of  1994-1995,  which boosted  the  international
competitiveness of Mexican exports. In addition, Mexico’s trade expansion did not solely
stem from NAFTA’s implementation but was, to a larger extent, the result of a decade-old
process  of  regional  integration  (Hufbauer,  Goodrich,  2004:  37-50).  However,  NAFTA
certainly boosted Mexico’s exporting performance, particularly during the late 1990s. 
14 Trade growth was propelled by a rise in investment flows on a regional level. Here again,
the Mexican economy benefited from this trend, and particularly from the considerable
surge in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) not only from its NAFTA partners, but other
competitors that sought to enter the North American market. Through a system of rules
of origins,7 NAFTA encouraged firms from outside North America (especially Japanese,
and more recently Chinese firms)  to use Mexico as an exporting platform to the US
market.  Based  on  data  from  the  United  Nations  Trade  Conference  on  Trade  and
Development (UNCTAD),  total  FDI inward flows to Mexico more than tripled from an
annual average of $3.5 billion over the 1987-1993 period, to $12.4 billion between 1994
and 2000, before reaching an annual level of $23.2 billion dollars in 2001-2007.8 Total FDI
stocks jumped from $41 billion in 1993 to $295 billion in 2008 (see figure 3). 
 
Figure 3
Source: UNCTAD
15 The United States once again provided the lion’s share of FDI inflows. In 2008, US FDI
inflows  accounted  for  41%  of  total  inflows  to  Mexico  (rising  up  to  53%  in  2009)  –
benefiting more than 21,000 companies – along with 68% of the total amount invested in
manufacturing, and 51% in the banking sector (US Embassy in Mexico; 2009). Canada’s
cumulative FDI paled in comparison with that provided by America, reaching $9.8 billion
over the 1994-2009 period (to 2,300 firms), yet amounted to nearly ten times as much as
in 1994. Its FDI inflows to Mexico averaged $617 million during NAFTA’s first fifteen years
(1994-2008)  and  represented  11%  of  total  inflows  by  2008  ((Secretaria  de  Economia,
op.cit.). This means that North American FDI accounted for three fifths of Mexico’s FDI
inflows in 2008.9 In short, NAFTA significantly accelerated the growth of regional trade
and investment flows, to the benefit of the Mexican economy that became increasingly
dependent on its North American trading partners.
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 NAFTA’s developmental legacy
16 While NAFTA's macroeconomic consequences are clear,  its socio-economic impact has
been the subject of greater controversies. One main reason for these debates lies in the
complexity of distinguishing what happened after NAFTA from what happened because of
NAFTA. Determining NAFTA’s direct effect on employment and wages is a difficult task to
the extent that economic indicators are determined by a wide range of  political and
economic forces. 
17 At first sight, the evolution of Mexico’s social indicators after 1994 might suggest that
NAFTA raised the prospects of Mexican households. Indeed, OECD statistics reveal that
poverty receded after NAFTA came into force. Different measures of the poverty rate
(under 60, 50 or 40% of the current median income after taxes and transfers) all show a
notable decline. Using the most common comparative indicator (50% of median income),
poverty declined from 21.7% in the mid-1990s to 18.4% in the mid-2000s. This contrasts
with an increase in poverty in the decade that preceded NAFTA’s implementation (from
20.7 to 21.7%). Similarly, income inequality receded, with the Gini Index (after taxes and
transfer) decreasing from 0.52 in the mid-1990s to 0.47 in the mid-2000s. Here again, post-
NAFTA trends contrast with the rise of inequality in the decade before the agreement
went into force, a period when the Gini Index jumped from 0.45 to 0.52 (OECD, 2010). This
confirms  the  findings  of  Campos-Vásquez  and  Esquivel.  Finally,  Mexico’s  Human
Development Index (HDI) – a composite indicator derived from data on health, education
and income by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) – also rose after
NAFTA. However, this indicator must be used with caution insofar as this upward trend
has  been  constant  since  1980  despite  the  severe  crises  from which  Mexico  suffered
(United Nations Development programme, 2010). 
18 A brief look at the employment picture in the post-NAFTA period reveals that the fears of
NAFTA critics  were exaggerated.  According to statistics  from the International  Labor
Organization (ILO),  general  employment in Mexico steadily increased during NAFTA’s
first fifteen years, adding 11 million jobs between 1993 and 2008 (from 33 to 44 million
jobs). The official unemployment rate generally remained between 2.5 and 3.5%, except in
the  aftermath  of  the  peso  crisis  of  1994-1995,  when  it  peaked  at  6.9%  in  1995
(International  Labor  Organization,  2010).  Under  closer  scrutiny,  however,  Mexico’s
employment and development performance seems only partially affected by trade and
investment flows. First, as figure 4 shows, there seems to be little correlation between
total FDI inflows to Mexico and employment growth. For instance, the dramatic increase
of FDI inflows in 1999-2001 (partly due to Citibank’s acquisition of Banamex in 2001)10 did
not have any significant effect on Mexico’s labor market; nor did the erratic evolution of
foreign investment after 2001 derail Mexico’s slow but steady job growth. 
 
NAFTA's Developmental Impact on Mexico: Assessment and prospects
IdeAs, 1 | 2011
6
Figure 4
Source: ILO, UNCTAD.
19 This finding dovetails with the conclusions reached by Blecker, who found that the rise in
FDI  in  the  post-NAFTA period  has  had  no  effect  on  Mexican  growth (Blecker,  2009:
1274-1284). The limited gains accruing from the rise in FDI could be explained by the
concomitant  decline  of  Mexican  domestic  investment.  Indeed,  as  Zepeda,  Wise  and
Gallagher have shown, overall investment levels since NAFTA’s implementation remained
more or less stable after NAFTA’s implementation, hovering around 19% of GDP during
the 1994-2006 period (Zepeda, Wise, Gallagher, 2009:7).
20 If FDI inflows did not have a significant impact on job creation in Mexico, trade could
have stimulated job growth. Mexico’s rising exports to the United States under NAFTA
and its employment performance seemed to be growing in sync between 1993 and 2008
(see figure 5). But while it would be tempting to conclude that NAFTA has been an engine
for job growth, NAFTA’s employment record must be scrutinized in the two sectors most
affected by trade liberalization: manufacturing and agriculture. 
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Figure 5
Source: ILO, US Census Bureau.
 
Mexico’s manufacturing employment under NAFTA
21 In the manufacturing sector,  job creation mostly occurred in the first six years after
NAFTA’s implementation (1994-2000). Employment in the maquiladoras sector reached a
peak of 1.3 million jobs in 2000 (on an annual basis) before receding to 1 million in 2003
(INEGI, 2007). In 2006, the last year for which data is available,11 it had not regained its
2000  level  (1.2 million).  Two  factors  explain  this  trend.  First,  and  as  previously
mentioned, Mexico’s exporting sector largely benefited from the devaluation of the peso
until the early 2000s, when its exchange rate recovered. Secondly, after 2000, Mexican
manufacturing companies faced increased competition from China. Boosted by its entry
in the World Trade Organization in 2001 and a massive wave of investment flows from
Western multinational corporations, China came to replace Mexico as America’s leading
manufacturing supplier,  thereby taking over Mexico’s  rank as the US second trading
partner. The recent recession and the corollary decline of American imports have not
raised Mexico’s  prospects.  As  of  this  writing,  the latest  statistical  survey of  the new
IMMEX  program  reveals  that  employment  in  Mexico’s  exporting  sector  (goods  and
services) declined by 17% between July 2007 (beginning of the subprime crisis in the US)
and July 2009 (from 1.910 to 1.578 million), before gradually recovering to reach 1.853
million in April 2011 (INEGI, 2009). This reveals, once again, the destabilizing effects of
Mexico’s dependency on the US economy. 
22 One of the main promises of NAFTA advocates was the idea that liberalizing trade and
investment flows across the continent would eventually reduce wage disparities between
Mexico and its North American partners. However, fifteen years after NAFTA went into
effect,  Mexican  living  standards  have  hardly  caught  up  with  household  income  in
America. Mexico’s GDP per capita has remained roughly a sixth of that of the United
States  since  the  early  1990s  (Wilson Center,  op.cit.).  The evolution of  manufacturing
wages  shows  a  similar  trend:  in  1993,  the  average  wage  of  American  workers  was
5.6 times higher than those of Mexican workers; in 2007, this ratio was at 5.8.  In the
maquiladoras – one of the sectors directly impacted by North American trade – real wages
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did  increase  after  1995.  As  revealed  by  the  data  from  Mexico’s  Instituto  Nacional  de
Estadística y Geografía (INEGI), this upward trend was particularly pronounced during the
2000-2009 period, when real wages increased by 17% (INEGI, op.cit.). In sum, employment
and wage levels  in the maquilas  took diverging paths since NAFTA’s  implementation:
between 1994 and 2000, employment increased and wages fell before slowly recovering;
whereas in the first decade of the twenty-first century, wages rose while employment fell.
23 Mexico’s sluggish employment record over the last  fifteen years cannot,  however,  be
attributed primarily to NAFTA. After the devaluation of the peso in 1994-1995, Mexican
workers had to face the antagonistic pressures of rampant inflation of import goods and
wage restrictions imposed by the federal government. This largely explains the decline of
real wages from 1995 to the end of the 1990s and their delayed recovery under NAFTA. As
mentioned before, the rise of China as a new industrial powerhouse also constituted a key
challenge for Mexico’s manufacturing exports.  Thus,  by itself,  NAFTA has only had a
limited impact  on Mexican manufacturing employment.  This  is  primarily  due to  the
disconnect between Mexico’s exporting sector and its domestic market. Indeed, because
of the very low domestic content (only 5%) (Carillo, 2010:27-43) of the goods transformed
by maquiladoras,  the spillover effects  of  Mexico’s  export  strategy have been seriously
constrained (Bizberg, op.cit.: 69-85). In short, NAFTA has neither led to a convergence
between American  and  Mexican  workers,  nor  spread  its  benefits  to  the  rest  of  the
economy. In fact,  given the geographic location of the export-oriented manufactures,
these limited gains are highly concentrated in the border-region, and therefore tend to
exacerbate  regional  disparities  in  Mexico.  In  effect,  states  in  Southern  Mexico  have
remained isolated from the process of regional economic integration. 
 
NAFTA’s impact on Mexican agriculture
24 Any analysis  of  the  evolution of  Mexican agriculture  under  NAFTA should  take  into
consideration  two  important  contextual  elements.  First,  the  recent  evolution  of  the
agricultural  sector  reflects  long-term  structural  transformations  in  the  Mexican
economy, as well as political reforms undertaken by successive Mexican governments
since the 1980s, designed either to accelerate or respond to these changes. Second, it is
important to emphasize the dichotomous nature of Mexico’s farming sector, and more
precisely, the distinction between small-scale and subsistence farming, and large-scale
agribusiness. 
25 A quick look at aggregate indicators reveals that Mexico’s agricultural sector at least
partly benefited from trade liberalization. As mentioned earlier, large-scale farmers in
sectors like vegetable, fruit or meats production increased their exports to the United
States and Canada. In these cases, NAFTA did help create more stable jobs and better
living conditions. A recent study of the development of agribusiness in the border-region
of San Quintin shows that NAFTA not only helped to convert seasonal jobs into more
permanent occupations, but also stimulated the local economy, thereby improving access
to services like water, sanitary drainage and electricity (Coubes, 2010: 45-61). 
26 This positive picture of Mexican agriculture under NAFTA does not, however, reflect the
serious  economic  dislocations  endured  by  Mexican  farmers  as  a  result  of  trade
liberalization. Between 1993 and 2008, Mexican agricultural jobs slumped from 8.1 million
to 5.8 million, a trend that largely offset job creation in the maquiladoras. By boosting US
agricultural exports to Mexico, NAFTA had a significant impact on employment in the
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agrarian sector. Under NAFTA, the market share of American corn producers in Mexico
jumped from an average of 15% over the 1984-1993 period to about 35% during 2001-2005
(Zahniser,  op.cit.:  12).  The influx of subsidized crops from American agribusiness had
devastating effects on agricultural prices in Mexico and directly threatened the revenues
of Mexican farmers. This was particularly the case with corn production, a crop on which
15%  of  the  entire  Mexican  population  still  depends,  according  to  some  estimates
(Burstein,  2007).  Hardly  concerned  by  the  scale  of  this  phenomenon,  the  Mexican
government dismantled corn tariffs at a faster pace than required under NAFTA. 
27 The first victims of these tectonic shifts were subsistence farmers. The liberalization of
corn and other commodities is estimated to have reduced farm income for as many as
three  million  small  producers  (Burstein,  op.cit.).  Given  their  low  education  level,
campesinos were ill-equipped to transfer to other sectors of the economy. Some of them
managed to integrate the service sector, whose share of the economy has significantly
increased under NAFTA – from 51% in 1994 to 60% in 2006 (Polaski, 2006). Others were
forced to join the ranks of the informal sector, consisting mainly of self-employment and
employment in microenterprises. Yet others opted for migrating to the United States.
Throughout  the  1990s,  the  number  of  Mexican  immigrants  crossing  the  US  border
increased from about 350,000 per year before NAFTA to half a million in the early 2000s
before declining significantly in the second half of the decade, partly under the effect of
the financial crisis (Passel, Cohn, 2009; Zepeda, Wise, Gallagher, op.cit.: 13). In the words
of one analyst, “migration has become an alternative to development.” (Wilson Center,
op.cit.: 26) These trends contrast with the early expectations of NAFTA’s advocates, who
anticipated that economic convergence between Mexico and the United States would
reduce Mexicans’ incentives to migrate to the North. This reveals the shortcomings of
NAFTA’s productivist model: under the demand of Washington, not only was immigration
left out of the agreement, but no supranational mechanism was devised to address the
social dislocations that would result from trade liberalization. 
28 If no financial transfer mechanism was integrated in NAFTA, the Mexican government did
seek to temper the disruptive effects of agricultural reforms through three assistance
programs:  1)  PROCAMPO,  a  transitional  income  support  program  for  agricultural
producers;  2)  Alianza  para  el  Campo,  an  initiative  designed  to  foster  agricultural
productivity through matched grants and support services; 3) PROGRESA, the reallocation
of food subsidies to the rural poor conditioned by the participation in basic education (for
the relevant age group) and health services. But while these programs did provide some
support for the rural poor, they also disproportionately favored Mexican agribusiness.
According to the Economist magazine, PROCAMPO was “hijacked” early on by large-scale
producers in the North, who received a large share of the program’s $1.4 billion (The
Economist,  2008).  This  is  ironic  since  this  segment  of  Mexican  agriculture  was  the
primary  beneficiary  of  agricultural  liberalization  under  NAFTA;  yet,  somewhat
understandable in the view of the government’s tendency to prioritize the development
of the export-oriented sector. 
29 Three  main  conclusions  emerge  from  this  brief  analysis  of  NAFTA’s  socio-economic
impact. First, NAFTA should not be held responsible for all the deficiencies of the Mexican
economy and its  political  system. An imbroglio of  structural  reforms in Mexico,  “big
events” (Easterly, Fiess, Lederman, op.cit.) like the peso crisis or the financial crisis of
2008-2009 as well as changing dynamics in the world economy have obscured NAFTA’s
real impact on the Mexican economy. Second, from a reductive business perspective,
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NAFTA  achieved  its  core  objectives  of  boosting  FDI  and  international  trade  on  a
continental scale. This success, however, has been tarnished by the third lesson from
NAFTA’s 15-year existence, i.e. its failure to live up to the employment and development
promises of  its  advocates.  If  poverty and social  inequality have declined in the post-
NAFTA era, the positive, albeit marginal effects of trade and investment liberalization on
employment and wages in the manufacturing sector have been offset by the significant
social  dislocation  experienced  by  poor  farmers.  As  a  result,  economic  convergence
between Mexico and the United States has remained an elusive goal. This does not mean
that NAFTA is a failed regional experiment. As the next section shows, NAFTA’s social
credentials could be restored with a combination of both domestic and supranational
reforms.
 
Making Nafta more development friendly
30 The idea of reforming NAFTA might seem at odds with the original intent of NAFTA’s
architects. Some have argued that NAFTA was only designed to focus on strictly economic
issues  and  should  not  be  instrumentalized  to  strengthen  the  political  axiom  of  the
regional integration process, let alone to create a North American community. This was
the implicit response that Washington and Ottawa gave to Mexican President Vicente Fox
when the latter stressed the need to upgrade NAFTA through a series of reforms (dubbed
“NAFTA-Plus”)  aiming primarily  at  liberalizing labor flows and creating a  trinational
compensation fund to assist the development of Mexico’s poor regions.12 This refusal is
emblematic of the discrepancy between the strict economic logic of the NAFTA model and
the  social  repercussions  of the  North  American  integration  process.  Whether  North
American  governments  like  it  or  not,  trade  liberalization  has  both  transnational
ramifications that affect each country’s interests, as illustrated by the continuing flows of
immigrants crossing the US border. 
31 The limitations of NAFTA’s productivist model have become increasingly clear in the light
of  the  tectonic  shifts  of  the  world  economy.  The  rapid  growth  of  the  Chinese
manufacturing sector now threatens the viability of  the North American competitive
model, that some have declared to be “out of breath.”(Deblock, Rioux, op.cit.) These new
global forces make social reforms more, not less relevant for NAFTA countries. 
 
Consolidating domestic reforms
32 For Mexican government officials, NAFTA’s limited employment benefits during its first
fifteen years of existence should have been a wake-up call about the limitations of export-
led growth strategy as developmental policy. As mentioned earlier, it has long been clear
that cross-border trade has only had marginal spillover effects on aggregate Mexican
employment. This largely explains why employment gains under NAFTA before 2000 were
concentrated in the maquiladoras, and why the limited wage increases in this sector did
not  spread  to  the  rest  of  the  Mexican  workforce.  Admittedly,  the  National  Plan  for
Development  (Programa  Nacional  de  Desarollo)  of  2001-2006  adopted  under  the  Fox
administration did stress the need to increase the value-added of the goods transformed
in Mexico, and the necessity of strengthening the linkages between the exporting sector
and local industries. However, as this analysis has shown, this has yet to bring benefits to
the rest of the labor market. This program and the more recent creation (2006) of the
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export  support  initiative  IMMEX confirm the  importance  that  Mexican  governments
continue to give to international trade as a development tool.  This is not to say that
maquiladoras are  an  outdated  economic  model  that  needs  to  be  abandoned.  Indeed,
maquilas have  long  proved  to  be  both  flexible  and  resilient  in  the  face of  external
challenges (Carillo, op.cit.).  However, Mexico’s strategic focus on export-led growth is
problematic in two regards: 1) it exacerbates Mexico’s structural dependence on the US
economy; 2) it distracts government officials from a pressing need to focus on domestic
investment such as infrastructure and education. 
33 The  economic  data  discussed  in  the  previous  sections  highlighted  Mexico’s  cruel
vulnerability to America’s business cycles – whether this be the recession of 2001 or the
financial  crisis  of  2008-2009.  America’s  economic  health  does  not  only  affect  the
performance of the Mexican economy through the decline of trade and investment flows,
but also through the fluctuations of remittances from the United States. For instance, the
recent crisis led to a decline of Mexican remittances of nearly one fifth, from $26 billion
in 2007 to $21 billion in 2008 (Beaubien, 2010). 
34 To cope with this  problem, Mexico will  need to find ways to diversify its  sources of
revenues, a long-lasting challenge that starts at home. As developmental specialists have
long  acknowledged,  Mexico  must  begin  by  improving  its  chronically  limited  fiscal
capacity by expanding its tax base. Indeed, as a proportion of GDP, Mexico’s tax revenues
are much lower than other OECD countries.13 President Calderon adopted a welcome step
in  this  direction  by  raising  corporate  taxes  in  2007.  Another  solution  would  be  to
prioritize  the  regulation  of  Mexico’s  informal  economy,  which  not  only  limits  tax
collection but also tends to drag average wages down (Chen, 2008). 
35 Another  way  to  reduce  Mexico’s  dependence  on  the  US  economy  would  consist  in
focusing on endogenous growth strategy, starting with increasing public investment in
education  and  research  and  development  (R&D).  Prioritizing  education  and  training
would  help  address  some  of  NAFTA’s  shortcomings  such  as  its  inability  to  create
employment in other sectors  than manufacturing.  Underinvestment in education has
long been the Achilles’ heel of the Mexican economy, a chronic weakness of which recent
Mexican administrations have grown increasingly aware. The administration of Carlos
Salinas de Gortari attempted to remedy the deficiencies of the Mexican education system
by launching the Educational Modernization Program (1989-1994). Renewed under Salinas’
successors, this program has achieved notable results in school enrollments, a success
that contributed to the decline of social  inequality in Mexico (Omelas,  2004:  285-306;
Campos-Vasquez,  op.cit.).  Since  1997,  President  Zedillo’s  PROGRESA program,  and its
successor  “Oportunidades”  have  also  helped  to  boost  access  to  education  and  health
services among the rural and urban poor.14 These steps should be complemented with
larger investment in higher education,  as well  as targeted research and development
programs to increase Mexico’s capacity for innovation. Emerging countries like India,
China and South Korea have demonstrated the value of combining open trade with strong
public investment in education – in schools, universities and R&D programs (Gallagher,
Zarsky, 2004). 
36 Investing  in  infrastructure  could  also  help  mitigate  NAFTA’s  tendency  to  exacerbate
regional  disparities  between  Northern  states  where  export-industries  tend  to  be
concentrated and rural Southern states that are often disconnected from North American
trade. President Fox’s Puebla Panama Plan was an ambitious – albeit controversial15 –
program regrouping a series of energy and infrastructure initiatives devised to connect
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Mexico’s Southern states with Central American countries. Largely underfunded during
Fox’s presidency, the PPP has been revived by the Calderón administration and could
offer  the  dual  advantage  of  reducing  regional  inequalities  and  diversifying  Mexico’s
economic  partnerships.  Mexico’s  ability  to  invest  in  infrastructure  and  education
programs  will  depend  on  its  ability  to  raise  revenues,  a  challenge  that  could  be
surmounted by supranational programs. 
 
Reforming NAFTA
37 Although  Mexico’s  domestic  reforms  will  be  instrumental  to  improve  NAFTA’s
developmental record, the scope of the North American accord should not be engraved in
stone but left open to renegotiation. The long-term success of the NAFTA model will
depend on the ability of its members to learn from their regional experience – or that of
other  integration  models  –  and  adapt  the  contours  of  the  agreement  to  the  new
challenges  of  the  world  economy.  This  doesn't  necessarily  mean  deepening  North
American integration. The problem with NAFTA lies not so much in its “institutional
deficit” (Bellanger, 2004 : 87-105) or its "deficient institutionality" (Grinspun Kreklewich,
1999: 17-33) per se – i.e. the absence of any supranational authority to enforce the rules of
the agreement – but in its productivist bias which led North American governments to
leave out the social ramifications of free trade. NAFTA’s dispute settlement mechanism
may not always protect investors and business interests as efficiently as NAFTA critics
claim,16 but  it  remains  undoubtedly  better  enforced and funded than e.g.  the  North
American  commission  on  labor  cooperation  (NACLC),  NAFTA’s  only  socially-oriented
institution.17 Thus, the North American integration model suffers from its deficient social
institutionality. This final subsection aims to offer a brief set of policy prescriptions that
could consolidate NAFTA’s social provisions and enhance its developmental potential. By
no means exhaustive, this list focuses on four crucial issue areas: investment, agriculture,
immigration, resource transfers. 
38 First,  Mexico  could  greatly  benefit  from  a  loosening  of  NAFTA’s  strict  investment
provisions. Although the protection of international investors is intrinsic to NAFTA, the
devastating effects of US-based financial crises on Mexican exports and, to a broader
extent, economic growth in Mexico, have demonstrated the deleterious side effects of the
current  model.  To  cope  with  this  problem,  the  adoption  of  safeguards  allowing  a
temporary return to stricter capital controls on foreign investment – e.g. modeled after
those adopted by other emerging countries like China or Brazil – could protect Mexico
against financial instability in times of crisis. In addition, a loosening of NAFTA’s strict
procurement and investment policies could allow Mexico to favor local contractors under
certain circumstances e.g. in the regions that have hardly benefited from NAFTA (Zepeda,
Wise, Gallagher, op.cit.). This could help mitigate the unequal effects that NAFTA has had
on the Mexican economy. 
39 The second issue area that has the potential to enhance NAFTA’s developmental legacy is
the contentious sphere of agricultural policy. In contradiction with the very principles of
free trade, NAFTA fostered competition between small-scale and subsistence farming in
Mexico and heavily subsidized American agribusiness companies. In fact, while Mexican
governments strove to dismantle tariff  protections at  a faster pace than required by
NAFTA’s provisions until 2008, the US Congress repeatedly renewed and sometimes even
increased its generous subsidies to the farming sector (through the Farm Bills 1996, 2002
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and 2008). A 2009 study by the Global Development and Environment Institute estimated
the costs for Mexico of “agricultural dumping under NAFTA” at $12.8 billion over the
1997-2005  period.18 Losses  to  corn  farmers  accounted  for  nearly  half  of  total  costs.
Considering the dramatic human effects that NAFTA had on Mexico’s small-scale and
subsistence farming, any developmental upgrade of the NAFTA model will have to make
agricultural reform one its priorities. This does not necessarily mean that agricultural
quotas  should  be  reintroduced.  Given  the  recent  increase  in  commodity  prices,
hampering trade flows could hurt  more poor people than it  would protect.  Bringing
equity  to  the  NAFTA  model  would  require  the  progressive  dismantling  of  American
agricultural subsidies, starting with those supporting large agribusinesses, which absorb
the lion’s share of American subsidies. If the idea may seem politically unfeasible, the
recent debates on the long-term reduction of the US national debt could provide new
opportunities to address this long-lasting issue. 
40 The  displacement  of  Mexican  farmers  is  interconnected  with  the  question  of
immigration.  International  migration  has  always  been  a  key  factor  of  international
economic convergence, whether it be transatlantic migration at the end of the nineteenth
century and its positive effects on European wages, or the economic benefits of labor
market integration in the European Union.19 Given the intense labor flows within North
America, immigration should be an integral part of any attempt to make NAFTA more
development-friendly  –  as  former  President  Vicente  Fox  has  long  claimed.  In  North
America, the free movement of workers would be a noble long-term goal, but is in the
short run nothing but a chimera. In the meantime, North American governments should
seek  to  optimize  the  developmental  potential  of  transnational  labor  flows,  first  by
protecting  migrants,  and  second,  by  encouraging  resource  transfers  under  a  new
trilateral remittance policy. 
41 One way to address NAFTA's deficient social institutionality would be to adhere to the
strict enforcement of labor standards in North America. This is not only important for the
protection of workers in Mexico, as "fair trade" advocates have long advocated, but also
applies  to  the  protection  of  authorized  and  unauthorized  immigrants  in  the  United
States, whose low wages can have a depreciating effect on the revenues of low-skilled
workers.
42 Another way to tap the developmental  power of  labor flows would be to develop an
effective trilateral remittance policy. While remittances are no substitute for domestic
investment  and  government  assistance  to  the  needy,  they  are  also  more  politically
palatable than foreign aid. North American states should capitalize on the recent shift of
remittances from the informal to the formal sector and undertake collective efforts to
secure and reduce the costs of  such financial  transfers.  Such measures could include
harmonizing regulations between state/provincial and federal authorities, ensuring fair
competition (e.g. transparent pricing) in the banking sector, supporting the development
of distribution networks in rural regions where access to remittance services are often
limited,  as  well  as  experimenting  tax  deductions  for  resource  transfers  toward
underdeveloped regions.20
43 Finally,  overcoming  the  political  hurdles  that  stand  in  the  way  of  the  long-term
integration of North American labor markets will  also require changing the image of
immigration to create a new form of solidarity between North American citizens. One
solution  could  be  to  intensify  higher-education  exchange  programs  and  high-skilled
temporary  visas  to  encourage  knowledge  transfers  between  Mexico  and  its  North
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American partners. This is crucial to alter the common representation of Mexicans as
low-skilled  workers.  Exchange  programs  like  Erasmus  in  Europe  have  proved  very
successful in changing people’s representations and could help foster North American
solidarity. 
44 Perhaps the most promising reform to improve NAFTA's developmental legacy would be
the creation of a regional compensation fund – an initiative long embraced by advocates
of  regional  integration in  both  government  and academic  circles.  Modeled  after  the
European Union’s  structural  and cohesion funds,  this  program could reduce regional
disparities  between NAFTA members.  Europe’s  experience  has  shown that  trade  and
investment liberalization alone cannot achieve economic convergence. Leaving aside the
recent impact of the financial crisis, the rapid growth of Ireland, Spain and Portugal over
the past decades has shown the merits of transfer programs as pivotal components of
regional  economic integration.21 In the case of  Mexico,  resource transfers  could help
invest in transport and communication infrastructure as well as education in Mexico’s
poorest states. These new investments would not only stimulate job creation but could
also  help connect  rural  communities  with the  rest  of  the  North American economic
sphere. Of course, it is easy to anticipate opposition in the US Congress against funding
such resource transfer programs, especially in the current context of budget cuts. To be
more politically palatable, the North American development fund must be presented for
what  it  truly  is:  a  policy that  addresses  the root  problems of  immigration and drug
trafficking, two endemic problems of North American relations that have cost the United
States billions of dollars during NAFTA's fifteen years of existence. This initiative would
certainly  depart  from NAFTA's  current  productivist  logic,  yet  could  also  help  North
American governments address the issues that have tarnished the reputation of NAFTA. 
 
Conclusion
45 To  conclude,  NAFTA  has  undeniably  boosted  trade  and  investment  among  North
American partners. At first sight, the Mexican economy seems to have benefited from the
process of regional economic integration. Yet, a closer look at employment and wage
trends  shows  that  NAFTA has  in  fact  done  little  to  foster  equitable  development  in
Mexico. Its impact on Mexico’s manufacturing sector has been in effect positive albeit
limited; yet it has largely been offset by the adjustment shocks of trade liberalization in
the agricultural sector. Some will argue that NAFTA was never designed to solve all of
Mexico’s  problems  and  that  the  agreement  has, after  all,  achieved  its  objectives  of
boosting trade and investment flows (Hufbauer,  Schott,  op.cit.).  However,  the rise  in
international trade should not be the ultimate goal of regional economic integration, but
rather a means of building a more prosperous regional economy that benefit the citizens
of all NAFTA countries. 
46 NAFTA's mixed results in the social realm can be partly attributed to the shortcomings of
Mexico's  domestic  policies.  To  maximize  the  socio-economic  potential  of  the  North
American integration model, Mexican decision-makers may have to rethink their focus
on export-led growth and prioritize domestic policies aimed at  investing in Mexico’s
future, through education, R&D and infrastructure. Beyond Mexico's domestic policies,
NAFTA's shortcomings are due to its narrow productivist logic. To remedy this problem,
North American governments should address  NAFTA's  deficient  social  institutionality
through a series of measures that would target some of the most pressing social issues,
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among which immigration, agriculture and resource transfers. Although NAFTA is not the
solution to all of Mexico's problems, it is embedded in the process of regional economic
integration and has,  therefore,  come to  incarnate  the  benefits,  but  also  the  costs  of
regionalism. Failing to address the social needs that are inherent to trade and investment
liberalization  risks  undermining  people's  already  fragile  confidence  in  a  regional
integration process that North American countries have been building for decades. 
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RÉSUMÉS
Cet  article  dresse  le  bilan  socio-économique  de  l’Accord  de  libre-échange  nord-américain
(ALENA) pour le  Mexique quinze ans après son entrée en vigueur.  À travers  une analyse  de
l’évolution des flux de capitaux et de commerce et de leur impact sur l’emploi et le niveau des
salaires dans les secteurs industriels et agricoles, l’auteur révèle les succès et limites du modèle
d’intégration de l’ALENA. Il conclut que si l’ALENA n’est pas une solution à tous les problèmes
socio-économiques  du  Mexique,  l'accord  souffre  malgré  tout  d'une  "institutionalité  [sociale]
déficiente" qui peut être consolidée par le biais de réformes nationales et supranationales. Au
niveau national, le gouvernement mexicain doit repenser sa stratégie de croissance tirée par les
exportations et donner la priorité à la réforme fiscale et aux investissements dans l'éducation et
l'infrastructure. À l'échelle supranationale, le modèle de l'ALENA devrait être amélioré afin de
combler ses lacunes sociales, en particulier dans les domaines de l'investissement, l'immigration,
l'agriculture et des transferts de ressources.
This article assesses the developmental record of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) in Mexico fifteen years after its implementation. After analyzing the evolution of trade
and investment flows and their impact on employment and wage levels in the manufacturing and
agricultural sectors, the author highlights the success and limits of the NAFTA integration model.
He concludes that while NAFTA should not be seen as a solution to all of Mexico’s socio-economic
problems,  NAFTA  nonetheless  suffers  from  a  "deficient  [social]  institutionality"  that  can  be
addressed through both domestic and supranational reforms. At the domestic level, the Mexican
government  should  rethink  its  export-led  growth  strategy  and  prioritize  tax  reforms  and
domestic investments in education and infrastructure. At the supranational level,  the NAFTA
model  should  be  upgraded  to  address  its  social  lacunae,  especially  in  the  policy  spheres  of
investment, immigration, agriculture, and resource transfers.
Este artículo presenta el balance socioeconómico del Acuerdo de Libre comercio de América del
Norte (TLCAN) para México quince años después de su entrada en vigor. Mediante un análisis de
la evolución de los flujos de capitales y del comercio, y de su impacto sobre el empleo y el nivel de
los salarios en los sectores industriales y agrícolas, el autor revela los logros y los límites del
modelo de integración del TLCAN. Concluye que aunque el TLCAN no puede ser la solución a
todos los problemas socioeconómicos de México, lo que el acuerdo padece, a pesar de todo, es una
"institucionalidad (social) deficiente" que puede consolidarse por medio de reformas nacionales
y supranacionales. A nivel nacional, el gobierno mexicano tiene que replantearse su estrategia de
crecimiento  dependiente  de  las  exportaciones  y  dar  prioridad  a  la  reforma  fiscal  y  a  las
inversiones en el sector de la educación y las infraestructuras. A nivel supranacional, el modelo
del TLCAN debería mejorarse con el fin de subsanar sus carencias sociales, particularmente en los
sectores de la inversión, la inmigración, la agricultura y las transferencias de recursos.
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